Overview
There are many concerns and anxieties specific to synthetic biology. The manipulation of life goes beyond the challenges faced by traditional engineering fields, raising ethical and social issues, concerns about impacts on ecosystems, and unpredictable consequences. We believe that it is necessary to mitigate the risks of how the synthetic biology in our project might affect the natural environment andsociety, and therefore we have focused on safety.
The following demonstrates that our project was carried out safely and poses no potential harm.
Current Policies in Japan
Upon investigating the flow of biosafety-related policies in Japan, the situation is as follows:
In 2010, the "Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety" (hereinafter referred to as the "Supplementary Protocol") was adopted at the fifth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The Supplementary Protocol requires the parties to take measures such as restoration of biodiversity in the event of damage (significant adverse effects on biodiversity) caused by transboundary movement of modified organisms.
To ensure compliance domestically, the "Act on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity through Regulations on the Use of Living Modified Organisms" (hereinafter referred to as the "Cartagena Act"), which is the domestic implementation law of the Cartagena Protocol, was revised in April 2017. The related ministerial ordinances and notifications were also amended in December of the same year.
As a result, on December 5, 2017, a Cabinet decision was made to conclude the Supplementary Protocol, and the government deposited Japan's instrument of acceptance with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the same day, making Japan a party to the Supplementary Protocol. As the requirements for entry into force were met, the Supplementary Protocol entered into force on March 5, 2018.
In line with this, we have ensured stringent biological and laboratory containment.
Laboratory Safety
Attendance of Biosafety Training
At our university, it was mandatory to attend biosafety training before using the laboratory. Therefore, all Wet Team members attended the biosafety training and received permission to conduct experiments.
Attendance of Biorisk Management Training
We conducted biorisk management training for students with Mr. Iki from the National Institute of Infectious Diseases. This training included not only lectures on biosafety and biosecurity but also group discussions to foster the ability to anticipate risks and develop strategies to prevent them.
In the morning, we learned about what risks are, the possible risks that might arise when starting an experiment, and past incidents. In the afternoon, we used LEGO bricks to represent the risks we envisioned and communicated our ideas. It also provided an opportunity to think about risks from perspectives we hadn’t considered through discussions with others. Based on the content of this training, the participating Wet Team members gained the "risk management skills" necessary for conducting synthetic biology experiments.
【Training content】
・Lecture on Biorisk Concepts
First, we received a lecture on the concept of biorisks. In this lecture, the concept of biorisks was explained from both a biosafety and a biosecurity perspective.
Biosafety:
Biosafety is about measures to protect people and the environment from the risks posed by pathogens. This includes the "awareness" of not harming oneself or others, the "attitude" of following rules and manuals, and the "actions" of appropriate physical containment in the lab. These fundamental concepts ensure the safe handling of microorganisms and accurate experimental results, helping prevent major accidents.
Biosecurity:
Biosecurity is about measures to protect pathogens from misuse by malicious individuals or inappropriate actions.
Specific risks include zoonotic diseases, biological weapons, invasive species, and food poisoning. From a biosecurity perspective, risk assessments, consideration of potential threats from emerging technologies, and strengthening of laws and regulations can prevent incidents or accidents.
Based on the concepts of biosafety and biosecurity and their examples, we learned about the risks that could arise during experiments and what precautions we should take. This knowledge was shared among the Wet Team members, enhancing the safety of our activities in synthetic biology experiments.
・Biorisk Imaginary Training with LEGO Bricks
Next, we conducted Biorisk Imaginary Training using LEGO bricks in a group setting. We created two types of LEGO models to represent our ideas about safety and security.
The first model was titled "Researchers Threatening Biosafety and Security." Each participant chose a sample model to recreate and then added one LEGO piece to represent a researcher who threatens biosafety and security. One Wet Team member created a model showing how a genetically modified organism they made unknowingly harmed them. Even among participants who chose the same model, different perspectives resulted in different creations, allowing us to gain a broader view of safety and security.
The second model had the theme "Express Your Thoughts on Biosafety and Biosecurity Using LEGO." After creating their own models, each participant presented and discussed their creation with the group. One Wet Team member created a model titled "An Experiment Classroom Run by Amateurs," representing an experimental classroom that had been opened without considering biosafety or security.
Fig.1 Photo of LEGO bricks created
Using LEGO bricks to express our thoughts allowed us to visually convey ideas that might be challenging to verbalize, and others provided insights we hadn't previously considered. Seeing others’ creations also gave us a glimpse into their perspectives.
・Practical Biorisk Management (Group Discussion)
Following this, we practiced biorisk management. Biorisk management involves analyzing methods and developing strategies to minimize the potential for biorisks to occur. We simulated this practice through group discussions using distributed cards and worksheets.
In one exercise, participants were given cards describing the characteristics of two microorganisms, A and B, and asked to consider the risks and benefits of creating recombinant organisms A'B and B'A by introducing genes from one into the other. Through this group discussion, we concluded that creating B'A could involve unexpected risks not present in creating A'B.
Another exercise involved cards describing scenarios with insufficient biosafety considerations. We evaluated potential risks, including how incidents like exposure or leakage might occur, factors influencing the likelihood of incidents, the importance of initial risk assessments, and the need for additional risk measures.
Based on these simulated exercises, we felt the importance of thoroughly researching the surrounding information about microorganisms to avoid unexpected risks when conducting synthetic biology experiments.
Fig.2 Photo with Mr. Igi of the National Institute of Infectious Diseases
Laboratory Environment and Equipment
The lab is equipped with a Class II safety cabinet and a clean bench.
Fig.3 Clean benches and safety cabinets
The lab also has an autoclave for sterilization.
Fig.4 Autoclave
Before conducting experiments in the lab, we explain the procedures to lab members (PI, PD, graduate students) and proceed with their approval. Additionally, we learned how to use experimental tools and equipment from graduate students and professors before using them.
The laboratory is classified as Biosafety Level 1, and we only handle non-pathogenic microorganisms that belong to a whitelist.
Project Design
From a biosafety perspective, a kill switch mechanism was devised to prevent genetically modified organisms from surviving outside the culture medium. Since tyrosinase activity requires copper ions, we focused on adding CuSO4 to the medium and used copper ions as the inducer for the kill switch.
CueR binds with reduced Cu+ within the cell, which activates the copA promoter. This leads to the production of TetR, which binds to the tetracycline operon operator and represses transcription, preventing the production of a cytotoxin. However, outside of the medium, the copA promoter is suppressed, allowing the tet promoter to activate and produce the toxin, causing cell death. The toxins used were holin and endolysin.
Research on holin and endolysin has provided insights into their safety when used for therapeutic purposes. For example, Schmelcher (2012) found that endolysins primarily target bacterial cell walls and do not affect eukaryotic cells, making them generally safe for therapeutic use. However, when treating Gram-negative bacteria, the use of outer membrane proteins (OMPs) or other enhancers may pose potential safety concerns, as they could also interact with eukaryotic cell membranes, necessitating careful evaluation before clinical application. Moreover, a study involving the use of phage-derived endolysin for treating skin infections reported no adverse effects, suggesting that endolysin can be safely applied topically against Gram-positive bacteria.
Fig.5 Design of Kill Switch Parts
This kill switch design can be adapted for other projects using copper ions as a medium component.
kill Switch Model
We created the kill switch model that based on parts, and tested.
The result is shown below.
Fig.6 the result of kill switch model
This figure shows that the production of holin increases as the copper ion concentration decreases.
The threshold concentration of Holin was set at 5e-7M (more detail in Model page). This Holin concentrations induce cell death. When the copper ion concentration is below 1e-10M, its steady state is greater than the threshold concentration of Holin. The kill switch is turned on after about 10 minutes when the copper ion concentration is below 1e-10M in the environment surrounding the cell drops.
Our designed kill switch can turn the switch on and off in a copper ion concentration-dependent manner. When the medium contains copper ions at a concentration of 1e-6M, the kill switch is off. However, when the bacteria leave the medium and the copper ion concentration around the bacteria falls below 1e-10M, the kill switch is clearly on.
Human practice of safety
Summary of HP related to Safety
We spoke with Wayne W. Schubert from NASA. From the discussion with Wayne, the following points became clear:
- Experiments in Earth's orbit are acceptable from a planetary protection perspective.
- There are significant concerns about sending organisms to other planets or moons, especially Mars and Jupiter's or Saturn's moons, where contamination is prohibited. Permission is required to conduct experiments on the Moon.
- The Cartagena Protocol strictly regulates the release of synthetic organisms into the Earth's environment.
- The "Committee on Space Research (COSPAR)" has formulated guidelines for the use of space.
Additionally, through our discussion with Dr. Nobuo Kurata, we identified ethical issues related to synthetic biology:
- Ethical issues regarding synthetic biology are not sufficiently studied. Particularly in Japan, discussions about synthetic biology are limited compared to other countries.
- It is crucial to prevent the spread of new organisms, just as with genetically modified or genome-edited organisms. The current Cartagena Protocol provides a regulatory framework for this prevention.
- Synthetic biology may be viewed as "playing God" in Christian or Islamic contexts, leading to ethical criticism. These cultural perceptions could influence the adoption and societal acceptance of the technology.
(For more details, refer to the HP page)
Lessons for Our Project from the HP
From these discussions, we summarized what is needed to apply our project to space.
- Clarify Research Objectives
Clearly define the purpose of taking microorganisms to space and explain how they will contribute to the research or project. This is crucial when applying to NASA or other space agencies. - Testing and Evaluation
The microorganisms to be taken must be confirmed for safety and functionality. We need to conduct experiments and evaluations on Earth to prove the microorganisms are properly managed and pose no unexpected risks. Moreover, it is necessary to evaluate how the microorganisms react in space and whether they impact other systems, such as those on the space station. - Containment and Sterilization Measures
Following NASA and COSPAR guidelines, strict containment and sterilization measures for microorganisms must be ensured. Microorganisms should not leak outside the spacecraft or container during their transport to space. - Adherence to Planetary Protection Guidelines
To prevent forward contamination, stringent regulations are in place, particularly for celestial bodies where life may exist (such as Mars and Jupiter's moon Europa). To comply with these regulations, it is necessary to prove that there is no risk of hindering extraterrestrial life exploration. This requires creating a planetary protection plan and obtaining approval from NASA or international organizations. Based on COSPAR guidelines, preparations must align with the regulations for the category of the targeted celestial body. - Submission and Approval of Experimental Plans
Experimental plans should be submitted to NASA or related space agencies for approval. These plans must include the characteristics and purpose of the microorganisms, containment methods, and countermeasures for any potential incidents. - Consideration of Ethical and Religious Issues
Understanding that synthetic biology may be ethically problematic in some cultures or religions and respecting these cultural sensitivities is essential. Engaging in dialogue with people from different cultural or religious backgrounds is crucial for understanding concerns about synthetic biology and taking appropriate measures. This dialogue also helps build trust in the project.
Summary
In this project, we aim to take microorganisms into space while thoroughly ensuring their safety and risk management. Through bio-safety and risk management training, we have developed the ability to accurately identify and address risks in synthetic biology experiments. Additionally, to minimize the risk of genetically modified organisms being released into the environment, we designed a kill switch using copper ions, ensuring that microorganisms self-destruct.
Moving forward, it is essential to further scrutinize the safety of the microorganisms to be taken into space and establish containment methods to ensure the project's success. To obtain approval from organizations like NASA, we need to adhere to planetary protection guidelines, finalize launch arrangements, and detail experimental plans in space. Moreover, consideration of cultural and religious backgrounds is vital, and it is our responsibility to explain these aspects to stakeholders. Ensuring the safety and reliability of the project requires continued efforts in safety management and promoting societal understanding.
Through these efforts, we aim to achieve scientific goals while preserving the space environment.
References
- Ministry of the Environment Website:Ministry of the Environment Website
- Nenoi M et.al. Low-dose radiation response of the p21WAF1/CIP1 gene promoter transduced by adeno-associated virus vector. Exp Mol Med. 2006 Oct 31;38(5):553-64. doi: 10.1038/emm.2006.65. PMID: 17079872.
- Narasimha Anaganti et al. (2017). “Proximity of Radiation Desiccation Response Motif to the core promoter is essential for basal repression as well as gamma radiation-induced gyrB gene expression in Deinococcus radiodurans.
- Schmelcher, M., Shen, Y., Nelson, D. C., Eugster, M. R., Eichenseher, F., Hanke, D. C., et al. (2012). "Evolutionarily distinct bacteriophage endolysins featuring conserved peptidoglycan cleavage sites protect mice from MRSA infection." Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy.
- Murray, E., Draper, L. A., Ross, R. P., Hill, C. (2019). "Therapeutic potential of bacteriophage endolysins for infections caused by Gram-positive bacteria." Journal of Biomedical Science.
- NASA Planetary Protection:https://sma.nasa.gov/sma-disciplines/planetary-protection/
- COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy:https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/assets/uploads/2020/07/PPPolicyJune-2020_Final_Web.pdf
- Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety:https://bch.cbd.int/protocol